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THE OPINION DELIVERY PRACTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1790-1945
JOHN P. KELSH *
“I think it useless and undesirable, as a rule, to express dissent . . . .”
—Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, see post, p. 593.
For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, see post, p. 629.
For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, see post, p. 634.
For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE BURTON, see post, p. 655.
For opinion of MR. JUSTICE CLARK, concurring in the judgment of the
Court, see post, p. 660.
For dissenting opinion of MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON, joined by MR.
JUSTICE REED and MR. JUSTICE MINTON, see post, p. 667.
. . .
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court
—Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 580, 582
(1952) (quoting Syllabus).
I. INTRODUCTION
The juxtaposition of these two quotes demonstrates that Supreme Court
Justices have not always had the same attitude toward the expression of dissent.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, known to us as the “Great Dissenter,”1 criticizes the
practice, calling it “useless and undesirable.”2 By contrast, seven separate
Justices file their own opinions in the Steel Seizure Case.3
* Associate, Sidley & Austin, Chicago, Illinois. Law Clerk to the Honorable William H.
Rehnquist, Supreme Court of the United States, 1997-1998; Law Clerk to the Honorable David B.
Sentelle, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 1996-1997. I would like to thank
my wife, Kristine, without whose encouragement and help this Article never would have seen the light of
day. I would also like to thank Professor Steven G. Calabresi, who helped both in formulating the original
idea for this Article and in guiding it to completion.
1. See PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT 3 (1969).
2. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 580, 582 (1952).
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Statistics from the respective eras suggest that each of these quotes is
representative of its age. During Holmes’ tenure on the Court, 1902-32,
opinions were presented unanimously 91% of the time.4 In the October 1951
Term, when the Court decided Youngstown, only 22% of the Court’s opinions
were presented unanimously. The 1951 Term was not an aberration. The
Vinson Court averaged a unanimity rate of only 27%.5
This statistical difference between the Holmes and Vinson eras is part of a
larger history of changes in the way the Supreme Court delivers opinions. This
Article tells the story of those changes, at least for the years 1790-1945.6
Proceeding era by era, I describe both external and internal change in the
Court’s practices.
By external change, I mean change either in the form in which opinions were
delivered or the frequency with which individual Justices expressed opinions
separate from the opinion of the Court. From this perspective, the story is rather
simple. Prior to John Marshall’s appointment as Chief Justice, the Court used
no set form to deliver opinions. During his tenure, three important practices
were established. First, an overwhelming majority of opinions were delivered by
a particular Justice speaking for the Court. Second, other Justices were able to
express their views separately from the view of the Court. Third, a great
majority of cases were decided unanimously. These practices had great staying
power. It wasn’t until 1941 that any major external change took place. In that
year the nonunanimity rate, which had been low ever since the Marshall Court,
exploded. The rate more than doubled between 1940 and 1941 and by 1948
rose to the approximate level it occupies today.7
The more interesting part of this history, however, details the Court’s
internal change. By internal change, I mean the attitudes that the Justices had at
different times toward the practice of writing separately from the Court.
Evidence of these attitudes is taken from the opinions themselves. Early Justices
4. This percentage excludes cases decided by per curiam opinions and does not count dissents and
concurrences without opinion.
5. These statistics for the Vinson era are taken from a variety of sources, including the annual
Harvard Law Review report on the workings of the Supreme Court and ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & ROY M.
MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES app. at 137-41 tbl.9 (1978).
6. These boundaries were chosen because 1790 is the year the Court first sat and by 1945 the
methods the Court uses to deliver opinions today were firmly in place.
In collecting data for this paper, I looked at every separate opinion filed on the Court during these
years. In completing this arduous task I had the assistance of numerous friends who helped by identifying
which cases had separate opinions. I am grateful to everyone who assisted in the completion of the project,
but I am particularly grateful to Peter Wall, whose contribution was remarkable.
7. Nonunanimity rates for the years 1800-1992 are represented graphically in Chart A, infra p.
175.
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believed that separate opinions were appropriate only in important cases,
importance being defined by the presence of a constitutional issue or public
interest. This attitude changed gradually over the years. During the Taney
period, Justices began to express the belief that dissent was acceptable to protect
their own records. This was part of a larger shift toward a view of the Court as
atomized rather than unified. Further change manifested itself during the 1864-
1940 period. Justices of that era expanded the universe of cases in which dissent
was appropriate, paid more attention to the thinking of individual Justices, and
began to view separate opinions as a legitimate part of the American legal
system. All of these shifts in attitude were an important precursor to the post-
1941 explosion in nonunanimity rates. They are also the intellectual source of
today’s view that dissent is appropriate in any kind of case at all.
II. HISTORY
A. 1790-1801
The published cases from the pre-John Marshall Supreme Court are found
in volumes 2-48 of United States Reports.9 A review of these Reports reveals
that many of the Court’s practices during these years were unsettled.10 Ev n th
Reports themselves were irregular: volume 2 was not published until 1798;
volume 3 came out in 1799; and volume 4 was delayed until 1807.11 Three
different men served as Chief Justice.12 A fourth man turned down the post13
and it was vacant in 1800. The Court was continually issuing new practice
rules. These rules covered subjects ranging from the procedure for service of
8. Volume 1 of United States Reports contains opinions of the Pennsylvania state courts.
9. Alexander James Dallas was the Reporter for all of the pre-Marshall era. Julius Goebel notes
that Dallas left out some of the Court’s cases from those years. See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., ANTECEDENTS
AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 app. at 795 (“Dallas’ Reports are not indicative of the actual number of cases
in error and disposed of by the Court.”).
10. The Court’s struggle to develop its own practices is understandable given that there was no
precise analog for the Supreme Court in any of the legal systems with which the Framers were familiar.
The Privy Council heard appeals from the colonies. Its opinions, which in theory were only advice to the
King, were delivered unanimously. The common-law courts of England, by contrast, delivered their
opinions seriatim. See Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial
Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L. REV. 186, 187-91 (1959).
11. See GOEBEL, supra note 9, at 665.
12. The three men were John Jay, John Rutledge, and Oliver Ellsworth. Jay left to run for governor
of New York, Rutledge left when the Senate rejected his appointment, and Ellsworth left when he fell ill in
France. See GOEBEL, supra note 9, passim.
13. William Cushing was nominated and confirmed but turned down the post in 1796. See GOEBEL,
supra note 9, at 749.
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process on states14 to the form for evidence in motions for the discharge of
prisoners on bail.15
Given this state of flux, it is not surprising that the Court used no set form in
presenting its opinions. In the approximately sixty-three16 cases that Alexander
Dallas reported for the years 1790-1800, the Court used a wide variety of
opinion-delivery methods. The most popular was stating that the opinion was
being issued “By the Court,” without any attribution to a particular Justice.17
Forty-five of the sixty-three cases (71%) Dallas reported were in this form.
These brief opinions usually contained very little legal analysis. The Court often
indicated in these orders that its opinion was unanimous.18 It would
occasionally, however, give no indication as to the vote19 and, on at least one
occasion, indicated that the per curiam order was being issued by a divided
Court.20
The second most frequently used method was delivering opinions seriatim.
This practice was patterned after that of the English common-law courts.21 I
the seriatim style, each Justice prepared and read his own opinion. The
individual opinions were frequently followed by a per curiam order stating
briefly the Court’s disposition of the case. Fifteen of the sixty-three pre-
Marshall decisions (24%) were reported in this form.
It is not clear what factors the Justices22 rel ed on in choosing whether to use
the seriatim style. The cases present two possibilities. First, Justice Chase’s
remark in the preface to his opinion in the seriatim case Bas v. Tingy23 suggests
that seriatim opinions were used when the Justices were in disagreement: “The
14. “Ordered, That when process at common law, or in equity, shall issue against a state, the same
shall be served on the Governor, or Chief Executive Magistrate, and Attorney General of such state.” Sup.
Ct. R., 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 335 (1796).
15. “Ordered, That all evidence on motions for a discharge of Prisoners upon bail, shall be by way
of Deposition, and not Viva Voce.” Sup. Ct. R., 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 120 (1795).
16. Any unattributed numbers are from my own count.
17. I will refer to these opinions as per curiam, although the Justices themselves did not use the term.
18. See, e.g., Jones v. LeTombe, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 384 (1798); West v. Barnes, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401
(1791).
19. See, e.g., Jennings v. Brig Perseverance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 336 (1797).
20. See United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121, 129 (1795). Peters is interesting also in that
the Court adjourned for a brief period to give the parties time to compromise. When the parties failed to do
so, the Court returned with its order. See id.
21. This was also the method used by the House of Lords when it rendered its decisions. See ZoBell,
supra note 10, at 189-90.
22. I do not know at what point the Justices began referring to themselves as Justices rather than as
Judges. In these early United States Reports, the Reporter uses the term Justice while the Justices refer to
each other as Judge.
23. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
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Judges agreeing unanimously in their opinion, I presumed that the sense of the
Court would have been delivered by the president; and therefore, I have not
prepared a formal argument on the occasion.”24
A second possible determinant of when seriatim opinions were used is the
presence of a constitutional issue. In his book The Constitution in the Supreme
Court, Professor David P. Currie identifies those cases throughout the Court’s
history that have presented constitutional issues. Currie identifies fourteen such
cases for the pre-Marshall era.25 The Court issued its opinion seriatim in seven
of these cases. This is a rate of 50%. The Court used the seriatim style in only
eight of the forty-nine cases (17%) that Currie does not cite.26 The rate of
seriatim opinion usage in cases presenting a constitutional question is therefore
nearly three times that of other cases.
While the pre-Marshall Court used the per curiam and seriatim styles most
frequently, it experimented with other styles as well. Two of its innovations
were later adopted by the Court. The first innovative opinion-delivery style was
the practice of having the Chief Justice deliver an opinion “for the Court.” On at
least three occasions, the Reporter identified the opinion of the Court not as
being given by the Court itself, but rather as having been delivered by the Chief
Justice.27 This minor semantic shift became important for two reasons—one
short-term and one long-term.
The short-term significance is that John Marshall was to seize upon this
method of opinion delivery and use it almost exclusively during the early years
of his tenure as Chief Justice.28 The long-term effect is that this new practice
24. Id. at 43. Justice Chase’s comment is odd given that there was no Chief Justice during the 1800
Term.
It was by no means always the case that seriatim opinions were used only when there was
disagreement. Justice Wilson’s comment in the seriatim case Talbot v. Janson proves this point. “As I
decided this cause in the Circuit Court, it gives me pleasure to be relieved from the necessity of giving any
opinion on the appeal, by the unanimity of sentiment that prevails among the judges.” 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
133, 168 (1795).
25. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 3-54 (1985).
26. My guess is that the most reliable determinant of which opinions were delivered seriatim is the
attention that the public gave to a case. I have discovered no reliable way to measure public interest. Cases
with constitutional issues may be a reliable stand-in for cases that generated public attention. G. Edward
White has noted that during the early Marshall period, newspapers covered the Court “almost exclusively
in the context of constitutional law decisions.” G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND
CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, at 928 (Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1988). Presumably, this
was also true of the pre-Marshall Court.
27. See Sims v. Irvine, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425, 456 (1799); Clarke v. Russel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 415,
424 (1799); Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 365, 366 (1797).
28. I should note that there is no evidence that Marshall responded specifically to Chief Justice
Ellsworth’s innovation. Leonard Baker speculates that Marshall may have gotten the idea from Lord
Mansfield, who used the practice while Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in England from 1756 to 1788,
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dramatically increased the importance of a particular Justice’s thinking. This
method focused attention not on what the Court did, but on what an individual
Justice thought. This enshrinement of a particular Justice’s opinion as the
operative opinion of the Court raised the stakes in opinion writing. Opinions
were no longer delivered by either unanimous Courts or for Justices writing only
for themselves. Now, what individual Justices thought was of serious
consequence.29 The increased concern with what each Justice said naturally led
to an increased concern with each Justice’s doctrinal consistency.30 Concern
over doctrinal consistency became, by the end of the Taney period, an important
reason for Justices to write separately. It is ironic, then, that Marshall adopted
the innovation of having one Justice speak for the Court as a means of unifying
the Court. This same innovation also introduced heightened concepts of judicial
consistency31 that later became an excuse for many Justices to write separately.
The second innovative opinion-delivery practice is related to the first. This
was the practice of having an individual Justice write separately from the Court.
In Sims v. Irvine,32 Chief Justice Ellsworth delivered the opinion of the majority
of the Court. Justice Iredell, who was unable to attend the reading of the opinion
due to “indisposition,” later delivered a concurrence which began: “Though I
concur with the other Judges of the Court in affirming the Judgment of the
Circuit Court, yet as I differ from them in the reasons for affirmance, I think it
proper to state my opinion particularly.”33
This opinion was the first time that an individual Justice had separated
himself from an opinion that had been expressed by a single Justice speaking for
the Court. This practice became established in the Marshall Court34 and of
or from Edmund Pendleton of the Virginia Court of Appeals, who also used the practice. See LEONARD
BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL, A LIFE IN LAW 414-15 (1974).
29. Of course it is not really Ellsworth’s shift but rather Marshall’s enshrinement of it that had these
effects.
30. G. Edward White has made the point that the Justice who delivered the opinion was not
necessarily the author of the opinion. See G. Edward White, The Working Life of the Marshall Court,
1815-1835, 70 VA. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1984). Concern over the consistency of individual Justices would
presumably not have become important until that link was established.
31. It may have also introduced concepts of judicial responsibility. William Cranch made this point
when he began reporting cases. Cranch wrote in the introduction to his first volume:
[T]he least possible range ought to be left for the discretion of the judge. Whatever tends to render the
laws certain, equally tends to limit the discretion; and perhaps nothing conduces more to that object than
the publication of reports. Every case decided is a check upon the judge. . . . The avenues to corruption
are thus obstructed, and the sources of litigation closed.
William Cranch, Preface, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) iii (1804).
32. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425 (1799).
33. Id. at 457.
34. See infra notes 53-80 and accompanying text.
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course flourishes today.
Summary
The opinion-delivery practices of the pre-Marshall period appear at first
glance to have had little relevance for anything that was to follow. The most
widely-used methods for delivering opinions, per curiam and seriatim, quickly
fell out of favor.35 On closer inspection, however, it is clear that several
important events took place. The first was the birth of the practice of having one
Justice speak for the entire Court. The second was the appearance of the first
opinion written by a Justice seeking to distance himself from an opinion that had
been delivered for the Court by another Justice. The third was the beginning of
the trend whereby Justices wrote separately at a higher rate if constitutional
questions were involved. All of these events were to take on added significance
during the Marshall period.
B. Marshall Period
Overview
John Marshall came onto a Supreme Court that had no set procedure for the
delivery of opinions. During his tenure three important developments took place.
First, nearly all opinions came to be delivered by one Justice speaking for the
Court. Second, by the end of his tenure, Justices were free to file concurring and
dissenting opinions when they disagreed with the majority. Third, Justices who
filed separate opinions felt compelled to explain why they did so. This
subsection describes and analyzes these developments.
Chief Justice Marshall, For the Court
The first and perhaps most important development of the Marshall years
was that the innovation of having opinions delivered by one Justice speaking for
the whole Court was enshrined as normal practice. The contrast with the
Court’s pre-Marshall years is striking. The early United States Reports include
opinions from all of the Justices; the Reports from the early Marshall years are
dominated by Marshall himself.36
Historians of the period agree that Marshall instituted the practice as a
35. See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
36. Remember the earlier-referenced point that G. Edward White made: Just because an opinion was
delivered by Marshall does not mean that he was its author. See White, supra note 30, at 36-37.
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means of strengthening the Court.37 In an era when the Supreme Court received
considerably less attention than the other branches of the federal government,38
Marshall apparently believed that presenting a unified front would bolster the
Court’s prestige. Statistics from the Marshall era show how successful
Marshall was at establishing his new practice.
In the years between 1801-06, the Court delivered non-per curiam opinions39
in sixty-seven cases. Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court in sixty of
these cases, Justices other than Marshall delivered the opinion in two,40 a d in
five cases the Court reverted to the seriatim style. In every one of these five
seriatim cases, the Reporter noted that Marshall was either absent or had
recused himself.41
These post-Marshall seriatim cases demonstrate the importance of Marshall
himself to the development of the practice whereby an individual Justice spoke
for the whole Court. The other Justices clearly preferred the seriatim system and
employed it when their Chief Justice was not present. Marshall’s persistence,
however, eventually paid off. By 1808, the other Justices began to abandon the
practice of delivering opinions seriatim.42 Justices other than Marshall began
delivering opinions for the Court, both when Marshall was not involved in a
37. See BAKER, supra note 28, at 414; JACKSON, supra note 1, at 21; DONALD G. MORGAN,
JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON, THE FIRST DISSENTER 173-75 (1954).
38. The best evidence of this is that the Court had to meet in a room in the basement below the
Senate chamber because the Capital planner had forgotten the Court in his design of the city. See
MORGAN, supra note 37, at 174.
39. For a discussion of the eventual demise of the use of per curiam opinions, see infra notes 45-48
and accompanying text.
40. The first of these cases was Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803), in which Marshall
recused himself. Marshall’s recusal patterns seem curious to the modern observer. He recused himself in
Stuart because he had tried the case in the lower court, see id. at 308, and in Marine Insurance Co. v.
Wilson, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 187 (1805), because he was “in a remote degree interested in the stock of the
insurance company.” Id. at 191. Yet he did not recuse himself in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
37 (1803), despite his involvement with Marbury’s commission. See also White, supra note 30, at 11-20
(describing Marshall’s involvement in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), despite
his recusal on grounds of financial involvement). White contends that Marshall drafted the claimant’s
petition for a writ of error and arranged for his friend Bushrod Washington to sign it. See id. at 14.
The other case was Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 272 (1804), where the opinion was
delivered by Justice Cushing. The Reporter did not state in Ogden that Marshall was not present. See id.
41. See Randolph v. Ware, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 503, 513 (1806); United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 399, 414 (1806); Marine Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 357, 384 (1806); Marine Ins. Co.
v. Wilson, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 187, 191 (1805); Lambert’s Lessee v. Paine, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 97, 117
(1805).
42. The practice wasn’t completely abandoned. In Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213
(1827), the four Justices in the majority delivered their opinions seriatim. In addition, the seriatim style
was revived in several important cases of the Taney era, see, e.g., cases cited infra note 99, and could
even be said to be alive today.
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decision43 and when he seemingly was there.44
The demise of the seriatim practice suggests that by 1808 the other Justices
had accepted the idea that opinions should be delivered by one Justice speaking
for the Court. Further evidence of the general acceptance of this idea is found in
the decline of the use of per curiam opinions.45
The pre-Marshall Court delivered per curiam opinions in 71% of its reported
opinions.46 The early Marshall Court continued to use this method.47 Th
Justices used the per curiam opinion frequently even after they stopped giving
opinions seriatim in Marshall’s absence. In 1808-09 the Court delivered its
opinion per curiam in 18% of all reported cases.
This percentage, however, began to drop dramatically in 1814, when the
Court reported its opinion per curiam in only two of forty-eight reported cases
(4%). This percentage remained stable for the next three years.48
By 1814, then, after twenty-four years of experimentation, the Court had
developed a practice whereby nearly all of its opinions were delivered by an
individual Justice speaking for the entire Court. The seriatim opinion had all but
disappeared, and the Court had drastically reduced the number of opinions it
issued per curiam.49
John Marshall had succeeded, but his new practice was soon criticized. The
most vocal critic was Thomas Jefferson.50 Jefferson argued that the practice of
having one Justice speak for the entire Court limited the accountability of the
individual Justices. In a letter to Justice William Johnson, Jefferson urged a
return to the use of seriatim opinions:
The Judges holding their offices for life are under two responsibilities
only. 1. Impeachment. 2. Individual reputation. But this practice
compleatly withdraws them from both. For nobody knows what opinion
any individual member gave in any case, nor even that he who delivers
43. See, e.g., Blaine v. The Ship Charles Carter, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 328, 331 (1808); Dawson’s
Lessee v. Godfrey, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 321, 322 (1808).
44. See, e.g., M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209, 211 (1808).
45. I use the term per curiam here to indicate all opinions that came not from an individual Justice
but from the body as a whole. The Marshall Court did not use the term per curiam.
46. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
47. The Court delivered its opinion per curiam in sixteen of the first forty-seven cases (34%)
reported during the Marshall era.
48. From 1815-17, the Court used the per curiam style in only 4% of its reported cases.
49. The Court continued to deliver nearly all of its opinions through the opinion of a single Justice
until 1896, when it again began to dispose of a significant number of cases with per curiam opinions. See
BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 5, at 137-41.
50. See MORGAN, supra note 37, at 172.
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the opinion, concurred in it himself. Be the opinion therefore ever so
impeachable, having been done in the dark it can be proved on no one.
As to the 2d guarantee, personal reputation, it is shielded compleatly.
The practice is certainly convenient for the lazy, the modest, & the
incompetent. It saves them the trouble of developing their opinion
methodically and even of making up an opinion at all. That of seriatim
argument shews whether every judge has taken the trouble of
understanding the case, of investigating it minutely, and of forming an
opinion for himself, instead of pinning it on another’s sleeve. It would
certainly be right to abandon this practice in order to give to our citizens
one and all, that confidence in their judges which must be so desirable to
the judges themselves, and so important to the cement of the union.51
In another letter, Jefferson complained that “an opinion is huddled up in
conclave, perhaps by a majority of one, delivered as if unanimous, and with the
silent acquiescence of lazy or timid associates, by a crafty chief judge.”52
Jefferson’s views never prevailed. The Court never returned to the frequent
use of seriatim opinions. Jefferson did, however, achieve a partial victory in the
adoption during those years of another practice that was to endure to the present
day. That practice was the delivery of separate opinions. The next subsection
considers the Marshall Court’s practices regarding the delivery of separate
opinions.
Separate Opinions
Dissents and concurrences were relatively rare in the early Marshall years.
Justice Chase, who had been one of the most active53 of the pre-Marshall
Justices, was the first to break rank, issuing a one-sentence concurrence in an
1804 insurance case.54 Justice Washington followed the next year with the
Marshall Court’s first recorded dissent.55 This slow pace of separate opinions
51. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), quoted in MORGAN, supra
note 37, at 169.
52. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), quoted in JACKSON, supra
note 37, at 24.
53. Justice Chase was active both in terms of reported seriatim opinions and in terms of reported
questions during the presentation of the case. Dallas reported more of the lawyers’ presentations than did
Cranch.
54. See Head & Amory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127, 169 (1804) (Chase, J.,
concurring).
55. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 397 (1805) (Washington, J., dissenting).
Washington’s opinion is interesting because he explained his reasons for dissenting:
I feel myself justified by the importance of the question in declaring the reasons which induced the circuit
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continued through 1806 and 1807. In each of these years only one separate
opinion was filed.56
The statistics show, however, that a change took place in 1808. In that year,
the Justices began to issue an increased number of separate opinions. This slight
increase in dissent activity continued through 1809 and 1810. In 1809 Justice
Johnson wrote separately in six cases and Justice Livingston concurred once. In
1810 the separate opinions were more evenly spread. Justices Todd,57
Johnson,58 and Livingston59 each delivered one separate opinion. Even Chief
Justice Marshall got into the act, delivering his first dissent in a case that he
thought had already been decided.60
From 1812-1661 this pattern more or less held. Nonunanimity rates were still
low, but many Justices contributed dissents.62 Two observations can be made
about this brief flurry of dissent. First, the Justices of this period rarely gave
reasons for writing separately. It would later become almost pro forma for
court of Pennsylvania to pronounce the opinion which is to be re-examined here.
In any instance where I am so unfortunate as to differ with this court, I cannot fail to doubt the
correctness of my own opinion. But if I cannot feel convinced of the error, I owe it in some measure to
myself and to those who may be injured by the expense and delay to which they have been exposed to
shew at least that the opinion was not hastily or inconsiderately given.
Id. at 397-98. Justices in later periods would echo many of Justice Washington’s themes from this first
dissent. Many other early dissenters gave no explanation for writing separately. It became much more
common to give such explanations in the late Marshall and early Taney periods. See infra notes 81-87 and
accompanying text.
56. This count includes only cases in which there is a majority opinion for the Court and does not
include seriatim opinions. Justice Paterson dissented in Simms v. Slacum, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 300, 309
(1806). Justice Johnson dissented in Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807). This dissent
was Johnson’s first. He became the Marshall Court’s most frequent dissenter. Johnson explained his
dissent in Bollman: “In this case I have the misfortune to dissent from the majority of my brethren. As it is
a case of much interest, I feel it incumbent upon me to assign the reasons upon which I [dissent]. . . .” Id.
at 101.
57. See Finley v. Lynn, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 238, 252 (1810).
58. See Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 323 (1810) (Johnson, J., concurring).
59. See id. (Livingston, J., concurring).
60. See Hudson v. Guestier, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 281, 285 (1810) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting)
(“MARSHALL, C.J., observed, that he had supposed that the former opinion delivered in these cases upon
this point had been concurred in by four judges. But in that he was mistaken. The opinion was concurred
in by one judge. He was still of opinion that the construction then given was correct.”).
61. Cranch reported no cases from 1811. Volume 10 ends in 1810. Volume 11 begins in 1812.
There are also no 1811 cases in the Court’s manuscript minutes. Due to illness and vacancies, the Court
had no quorum. See Letter from Herb Johnson, Professor, University of South Carolina, to David Daskal,
Circulation Director, Northwestern University Law Library (Nov. 29, 1995) (on file with author).
Marshall was late for the beginning of the 1812 term due to an injury he received “by the over-setting of
the stage coach on his journey from Richmond.” Hudson v. Guestier, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 1, 1 n.* (1812).
62. During this five-year period, Justices Johnson and Story each wrote separately eight times,
Livingston six times, Marshall four times, and Duvall twice. Only Justice Todd failed to deliver a separate
opinion.
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Justices to express their regret at having to dissent and to give reasons for doing
so.63 Justices of the early Marshall period occasionally gave their reasons for
choosing to write separately,64 but more frequently did not.65 From the
historian’s perspective, it seems odd that later Justices would feel obliged to
explain their decision to write separately, but the initiators of the practice would
find explanation largely unnecessary.
Second, this initial period when many different Justices found it acceptable
to write separately was extremely short-lived. In 1817 the only separate opinion
was a dissent from Chief Justice Marshall.66 In 1818 Justice Johnson delivered
four separate opinions. No other Justice delivered any. From 1818 until 1827,
Justice Johnson was virtually the only Justice who wrote any separate opinions.
In these ten years Justice Johnson wrote a total of seventeen concurrences and
dissents. All of the other Justices combined wrote a total of six—and two of
these came in Dartmouth College.67
These statistics suggest that Johnson was alone in fighting to establish the
practice of allowing Justices to write separately from the majority of the Court.
Writings from the period support this as well. In 1822 Johnson wrote Jefferson
63. See, e.g., supra note 56. Justices in later years cited the importance of the case and a desire to
remain consistent as two of the most popular reasons for writing separately.
64. See, e.g., The Commercen, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 382, 395 (1816) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting);
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 362 (1816) (Johnson, J., concurring); The Venus, 12
U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 287 (1814) (Story, J., concurring).
65. Justice Livingston, for example, never once explained what motivated him to make his
disagreement public. Justices who chose to make their disagreement public nearly always explained why
they believed the majority was incorrect. I say “nearly” always because this period also saw the first
dissent without opinion. See Herbert v. Wren, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 370, 382 (1813) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting). What I am referring to in the text is reasons given for chooosing to make disagreements
known, rather than merely acquiescing in the majority’s opinion.
66. See Shipp v. Miller’s Heirs, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 316, 326 (1817) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
This particular dissent is the most mundane of the nine Marshall wrote. Marshall sometimes explained his
reasons for writing separately, saying on one occasion that the issue was “very interesting to the United
States.” The Commercen, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 382, 395 (1816). In Shipp, however, Marshall gave no such
explanation, beginning his dissent by writing: “I am not satisfied that the call for the buffalo road ought to
be discarded as immaterial. It appears to me to bear a strong analogy to a call for a marked tree.” Shipp,
15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 326-27 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
67. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). Justices Washington and Story concurred in Dartmouth
College. Duvall dissented without opinion. Dissenting without opinion in one of the most important cases
of his time somehow seems appropriate for Justice Duvall, who some have argued is the most insignificant
Justice of all time. Compare Irving Dilliard, Gabriel Duvall, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 1789-1978, at 419 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980), with David P. Currie,
The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 466 (1983). Duvall wrote
very few opinions of any sort. He seems to have suffered from a lack of respect right from the start. In the
Banks & Brothers edition of Cranch’s Reports, Duvall’s name is spelled incorrectly in the Report for
1812, his first year on the bench. See, e.g., Freeland v. Heron, Lenox & Co., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 147
(1812).
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in response to Jefferson’s urging that he push the Court to return to the use of
seriatim opinions. Johnson detailed the difficulty he had encountered in
expressing his own opinion:
Some case soon occurred in which I differed from my brethren, and I
thought it a thing of course to deliver my opinion. But, during the rest of
the session I heard nothing but lectures on the indecency of judges cutting
at each other, and the loss of reputation which the Virginia appellate
court had sustained by pursuing such a course. At length I found that I
must either submit to circumstances or become such a cypher in our
consultations as to effect no good at all.68
Marshall himself had made his preference for unanimity public in an 1819
article he published in a Philadelphia newspaper:
The course of every tribunal must necessarily be, that the opinion which
is to be delivered as the opinion of the court, is previously submitted to
the consideration of all the judges; and, if any part of the reasoning be
disapproved, it must be so modified as to receive the approbation of all,
before it can be delivered as the opinion of all.69
Marshall was also known to acquiesce silently when his own opinion did not
command a majority70 and even on occasion write opinions with which he did
not agree.71
Johnson, however, was resistant to the pressures of his colleagues and
persisted in the issuance of separate opinions. He eventually settled on a
compromise. He wrote to Jefferson in 1823: “On the subject of seriatim
opinions in the Supreme Court I have thought much, and have come to the
resolution to adopt your suggestion on all subjects of general interest;
particularly constitutional questions. On minor subjects it is of little public
importance.”72
Eventually, it seems, Johnson won out. By 1827 opinion-delivery practices
68. See Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1822), quoted in MORGAN,
supra note 37, at 182.
69. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 22 (citing 4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN
MARSHALL 320 (1919)).
70. In one case, Marshall began a dissent, “I should now, as is my custom, when I have the
misfortune to differ from this Court, acquiesce silently in its opinion . . . .” Bank of United States v.
Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 90 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
71. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 25.
72. See Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 11, 1823), quoted in MORGAN,
supra note 37, at 184.
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began to change. Johnson was no longer the only Justice willing to write
separately. In Ogden v. Saunders,73 th  four Justices in the majority delivered
their opinions seriatim and Justice Marshall dissented.74 Th re was evidence
apart from Ogden, however, that attitudes towards separate opinions had
shifted. Marshall,75 Washington,76 and Thompson77 each dissented in one other
case.
Things slowed down again in 1828-29 as Thompson’s one dissent was the
only non-Johnson separate writing.78 In 1830-32, however, separate writings
flourished among all members of the Court, with Story, Johnson, Thompson,
Baldwin,79 Marshall, and McLean all registering at least one separate writing.
In 1833-35, nonunanimity rates were down again, as Johnson, Duvall, and
Marshall all left the Court.80 But the tradition of writing separately survived.
When Roger Taney took over as Chief Justice in 1836, concurrences and
dissents were frequent.
Rationales
Not only had Johnson’s habit of writing separately survived, so too had his
categorization of which cases justified the public expression of dissent. As noted
above, Johnson wrote to Jefferson that he would write separately “on all
subjects of general interest; particularly constitutional questions.”81 This is the
pattern Johnson followed for most of his career. Johnson frequently said that
73. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
74. This was Marshall’s only dissent in a constitutional case. This is unusual in that nonunanimity
rates for the Court as a whole were higher in constitutional cases. For a discussion of these statistics, see
infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
75. See Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 90 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting).
76. See Mason v. Haile, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 370, 379 (1827) (Washington, J., dissenting).
77. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 449 (1827) (Thompson, J., dissenting).
78. See Weston v. City Council, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 473 (1829) (Thompson, J., dissenting).
79. Baldwin, appointed to the Court in 1830, began to dissent even more frequently than Johnson.
Baldwin frequently registered dissents without opinion. Baldwin was unusual in other ways as well. The
Reporter noted on several occasions that Baldwin failed to deliver to him a copy of a separate opinion that
he had prepared. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 596 (1832). Baldwin seems to
have recognized that he was different from the other Justices. He referred on one occasion to the
“peculiarity” of his own views. Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 212 (1837) (Baldwin, J., concurring).
This concurrence is printed in the Banks & Brothers version of the United States Reports, but not in the
DeSilver, Thomas & Co. edition.
80. By 1835 the Court had stopped taking constitutional cases because there were so few Justices.
See, e.g., Mayor of New York v. Miln, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 85 (1835) (“The Court cannot know whether
there will be a full Court during the term; but as the Court is now composed, the constitutional cases will
not be taken up.”). As discussed infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text, cases presenting constitutional
cases drew separate opinions at a higher rate than cases which did not.
81. See Letter from Johnson to Jefferson, supra note 72, at 182.
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dissent was appropriate when the question before the Court was important. He
usually defined important cases as those involving constitutional issues or
questions of great interest to the public.82
When dissents began to pick up again in the years between 1827 and 1833,
many of the Justices who wrote separately explained their reasons for doing so.
The reasons they gave echoed those that Justice Johnson had been giving all
along.83 The Justices spoke of their obligation to make their own opinions
known in important cases, in cases presenting constitutional issues, and cases of
great public interest. Justice Thompson prefaced an 1827 dissent by writing:
It is with some reluctance, and very considerable diffidence, that I have
brought myself publicly to dissent from the opinion of the Court in this
case; and did it not involve an important constitutional question . . . I
should silently acquiesce in the judgment of the Court, although my own
opinion might not accord with theirs.84
Marshall wrote in the same term:
I should now, as is my custom, when I have the misfortune to differ from
this Court, acquiesce silently in its opinion, did I not believe that the
judgment of the Circuit Court of Virginia gave general surprize to the
profession, and was generally condemned.85
Similarly, Justice Washington explained:
It has never been my habit to deliver dissenting opinions in cases where it
has been my misfortune to differ from those which have been pronounced
by a majority of this Court. Nor should I do so upon the present
82. See, e.g., Weston v. City Council, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 470 (1829) (Johnson, J., dissenting)
(“Entertaining different views . . . from the majority of the Court, and wishing generally that my reasons
for my opinions on constitutional questions should appear, where they cannot be misunderstood or
misrepresented, I will briefly state the ground upon which I dissent from the decision now rendered.”);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 222 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring) (“I have, also, another
inducement: in questions of great importance and great delicacy, I feel my duty to the public best
discharged, by an effort to maintain my opinions in my own way.”); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 363 (1816) (Johnson, J., concurring) (“I have another reason for expressing my opinion on
this occasion. I view this question as one of the most momentous importance; and one which may affect, in
its consequences, the permanence of the American union.”); Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101
(1807) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (“As it is a case of much interest, I feel it incumbent upon me to assign the
reasons upon which I [dissent]. . . .”).
83. Justices other than Johnson had made such explanations before. The rate at which they appeared,
however, increased during 1827-33, and the explanations began to all sound the same.
84. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 449-50 (1827) (Thompson, J., dissenting).
85. Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 90 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting).
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occasion, did I not believe, that the opinion just delivered is at variance
with the fundamental principles [of] Sturges v. Crowninshield, and
Ogden v. Saunders . . . . A regard for my own consistency, and that, too,
upon a great constitutional question, compels me to record the reasons
upon which my dissent is founded.86
Justice McLean invoked similar language in explaining his decision to write
separately in 1832.87
At one point or another, nearly all of the other Justices88 express d Johnson’s
idea that dissenting was acceptable in important cases, importance being
measured by public interest or presence of a constitutional issue.89 Statistic
show they practiced what they preached. Nonunanimity rates were considerably
higher in constitutional cases throughout the Marshall era. In the seventy-four
cases that Professor Currie90 cit s as presenting a constitutional issue, Justices
filed separate opinions in twenty-six—a rate of 35%. This is nearly four times
higher than the 9% nonunanimity rate that prevailed in the 917 Marshall-era
cases that Currie does not cite.
Summary
When John Marshall began his term in 1801, opinion-delivery practices
were unsettled. By the time he died in 1835, a number of important practices
had become firmly entrenched. Opinions were nearly always delivered by one
Justice speaking for the Court. Other Justices were free to deliver separate
opinions of their own. Justices who did write separately referred frequently to
the importance of the case before them.
Some of these developments would last until the present day. The Court still
nearly always announces its decisions through the opinion of a single Justice
speaking for the Court and other Justices are still free to write separately. In the
period following the Marshall years, however, there was a major change in the
rationales that Justices gave for writing separately. A discussion of these
shifting rationales is the focus of much of the remainder of this Article.
86. Mason v. Haile, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 370, 379 (1827) (Washington, J., dissenting).
87. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 563 (1832) (McLean, J., concurring).
88. Not every Justice seems to have bought into these explanations for writing separately. Justice
Baldwin dissented frequently without explaining himself.
89. The practice of explaining dissents became entrenched during the early Taney years. Taney
Court Justices dissented more regularly than Marshall Court Justices, but they were also more consistent,
at least in the early years, at explaining their dissents. It became almost pro forma for them to express
regret at having to dissent but then to say that it was appropriate in such an important case.
90. See CURRIE, supra note 25, at 61-198
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C. The Taney Court
Overview
In the early years of the Taney Court, the opinion-delivery practices of the
Marshall Court continued largely unchanged. Opinions were still given by a
single Justice speaking for the entire Court and other Justices were allowed to
write separately. Nonunanimity rates increased somewhat, but the
overwhelming majority of opinions were still presented without recorded
dissent.91 When Justices did dissent, they felt compelled to offer an explanation
and the explanation given most frequently was that the case was important. By
the late Taney period, however, there had been a change.
Nonunanimity rates stayed more or less the same, and the form of the
opinion did not change, but Justices began to offer different reasons for writing
separately. Justices began to say that they were compelled to write separately to
maintain personal consistency. The separate opinion was a means by which the
individual Justices accomplished the newly-important goal of defending their
own judicial records. This new attitude toward dissent was part of a larger shift
in the Justices’ conception of the Court. Justices for the first time began to think
of the Court less as a cohesive whole and more as a collection of individuals.
The Early Taney Court
The Marshall Court, which had been hampered in its later years by illnesses
and vacancies,92 came to an official end with Marshall’s death in 1835. His
office was not immediately filled, however, and the Court was without a Chief
Justice for the 1836 Term. This was a year of remarkable unity on the Court.
Only one dissenting opinion was reported for the entire term.93
91. Nonunanimity rates were, however, higher than those in the Marshall era. See infra note 96 and
accompanying text.
92. See supra note 80.
93. See Boone v. Chiles, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 177 (1836) (McLean, J., dissenting). McLean stated,
“Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, I am constrained to state, as succinctly as I can, the reasons
why I dissent from the opinion just delivered.” Id. at 234. McLean’s emphasis on succinctness is echoed
by many later dissenters in the Taney period. Perhaps because they were embarrassed at registering dissent
at all, a number of Justices introduced dissents with promises of brevity. See, e.g., Silsby v. Foote, 61 U.S.
(20 How.) 378, 387 (1857) (Grier, J., dissenting); Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 496
(1854) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
In his famous Dred Scott dissent, Justice Curtis offered the following eloquent explanation for the
length of his opinion:
I have expressed my opinion, and the reasons therefor, at far greater length than I could have wished,
upon the different questions on which I have found it necessary to pass, to arrive at a judgment on the
case at bar. These questions are numerous, and the grave importance of some of them required me to
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When Taney took office for the 1837 Term, the number of dissenting and
concurring opinions rose. In 1837 Justices on the Court delivered three
concurring opinions and five dissents.94 In 1838 the Justices delivered a total of
seven separate opinions.95 Both of these totals were higher than all but the most
contentious of the Marshall years.96 As a whole the Taney Court had a higher
nonunanimity rate than had the Marshall Court (20% vs. 11%).
In addition to raising the nonunanimity rate, the early Taney Court also
introduced a couple of slight variations in opinion-delivery style. The first was
an increase in the number of cases with multiple separate opinions. Such cases,
now so commonplace, were extremely rare during the late Marshall years.97 In
1837 alone, however, three of the twenty cases before the Court resulted in
multiple separate opinions.98 The Court retained this practice throughout
Taney’s tenure. In many of the important cases of the era, the Taney Court
delivered its opinions in a modified seriatim style.99
A second minor innovation of the early Taney Court was the practice of
declining to give an opinion when the vote was evenly split.100 This happened on
exhibit fully the grounds of my opinion. To have done either more or less, would have been inconsistent
with my views of my duty.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 633 (1856) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
94. For these statistics, the author’s count differs slightly from the numbers provided in BLAUSTEIN
& MERSKY, supra note 5, at 137-41. I have relied on my own count whenever there has been a
discrepancy.
95. In addition to these written expressions of disagreement, Justice Baldwin dissented frequently
without opinion, making the nonunanimity rates for these two years—31% and 47%—higher than they
had ever been.
96. The 1831 Term featured nine separate opinions.
97. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
98. See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837); Briscoe v. Bank of
Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
Interestingly, all three of these cases were held over from the Marshall Court. Story dissented in all three
cases. In Miln Story said that he knew that Marshall would have voted with him. See Miln, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) at 160.
99. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). I say a “modified” seriatim
style because during the Taney era there was usually one Justice who spoke for the Court. In the classic
seriatim style this is not the case.
In some of the Taney Court’s seriatim cases, however, there is no Justice who speaks for the Court.
See, e.g., Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416, 427 (1853) (Taney, C.J.) (“In this
case the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio is affirmed. But the majority of the court who
give this judgment, do not altogether agree in the principles upon which it ought to be maintained. I
proceed, therefore, to state my own opinion . . . .”); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 561 (1840)
(Taney, C.J.) (“The members of the Court, after the fullest discussions, are so divided that no opinion can
be delivered as the opinion of the Court.”).
These opinions could be the first plurality opinions in the Court’s history.
100. The number of Justices fluctuated during the Taney era. For example, only seven Justices sat in
1837. The number rose to nine in 1838.
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at least two occasions.101 In these situations, the Court allowed the lower court’s
opinion to stand.
Despite these minor differences, what is most significant about the Taney
Court’s opinion-delivery practices is how similar they were to those of the
Marshall Court. When Marshall became Chief Justice he made sweeping
changes to the way the Court delivered its opinions.102Taney did no such thing.
He may have tinkered with the Marshall Court’s model, but all of the basic
practices were continued.
Not only were the basic opinion-delivery practices continued, the Justices’
attitudes toward dissent also stayed the same. This is evident in two ways. First,
Justices in the early Taney period, as had their Marshall Court predecessors,
often apologized for dissenting. The most frequent apologizer during the Taney
Court was Justice Daniel, who joined the Court in 1841.103 Daniel spoke at
various times of his “unaffected diffidence”104 a d “unfeigned regret”105 at
having to differ with the majority. He did so on one occasion in spite of his
“profound[] respect for the opinions of [his] brethren”106 and hoped on another
that “the magnitude of these topics would . . . excuse the hazard of prolixity.”107
Second, and more importantly, the Justices also accepted the Marshall Court
Justices’ reasoning regarding what types of cases justified dissent.108 By the end
of the Marshall period, nearly all of the Justices had expressed a belief that
dissent was acceptable in important cases—importance being defined by the
presence of a constitutional issue or the attention of the public.109 Taney-era
Justices apparently shared the belief that dissent was acceptable in these types
101. See Ellis v. Jones, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 197, 201 (1843); Strout v. Foster, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 89, 95
(1843). The Court did this same thing in January 1996 when it split 4-4 on the question whether menus in
a computer operating system were entitled to copyright protection. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l,
Inc., 516 U.S. 233, 233 (1996) (“The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
is affirmed by an equally divided Court.”).
102. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
103. Justice Daniel was also the Taney Court’s most frequent dissenter.
104. Barnard v. Adams, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 270, 308 (1851).
105. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 636 (1842).
106. Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 180 (1845).
107. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 593 (1852).
108. This is not surprising, given that many of the Justices were the same.
109. These two definitions of “important” are hard to differentiate, as the Court was regarded as a
leader only in public law. See CARL B. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, at 321 (1974).
Public interest in the Court’s decisions would therefore have been limited to public law issues. Also
mentioned occasionally as a justification for expressing dissent was the importance of the issues to the
parties. See, e.g., Bend v. Hoyt, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 263, 273 (1839) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
practical effect it is to have upon the course of business at the customhouse . . . must be my excuse for
publicly dissenting.”).
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of cases. In Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes110 Taney wrote: “As this
case has attracted some share of the public attention, and a diversity of opinion
exists on the bench; it is proper that I should state the grounds upon which I
dissent . . . .”111 In Rhode Island v. Massachusetts112 he wrote: “It has, I find,
been the uniform practice in this Court, for the justices who differed from the
Court on constitutional questions, to express their dissent. In conformity to this
usage, I proceed to state briefly the principle on which I differ . . . .”113
Taney’s views were expressed by many other Justices. Story wrote in 1837:
I offer no apology for this apparent exception to the course which I have
generally pursued, when I have had the misfortune to differ from my
brethren, in maintaining silence; for in truth it is no exception at all, as
upon constitutional questions I ever thought it my duty to give a public
expression of my opinions, when they differed from that of the court.114
Justice Campbell began his Dred Scott opinion: “I concur in the judgment
pronounced by the Chief Justice, but the importance of the cause, the
expectation and interest it has awakened, and the responsibility involved in its
determination, induce me to file a separate opinion.”115 Justices Woodbury116
and McLean117 made similar points in 1846 and 1847.
As was true of the Marshall period, statistics from the Taney Court show
that dissent was more prevalent in constitutional cases than in other areas.
Professor Currie identifies 103 cases that presented a constitutional question to
the Taney Court.118 Justices registered at least one separate opinion in forty-five
of these cases—approximately 44%. In the 1337 cases that Currie does not cite,
the Taney Court Justices registered at least one separate writing in 242—
approximately 18%. Nonunanimity rates were almost two and one-half times
higher in constitutional cases than they were in all other cases. The idea that
dissent was appropriate in constitutional cases and cases in which the public had
110. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
111. Id. at 626.
112. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).
113. Id. at 752.
114. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting).
115. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 493 (1856) (Campbell, J., concurring).
116. See Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646, 693 (1846) (Woodbury, J., dissenting) (“I
consider it due to the importance of this subject to the parties and the public . . . to state the reasons for my
dissent.”).
117. See Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 435 (1847) (McLean, J., dissenting) (“I dissent from
the opinion of the court, and, as this is a constitutional question, I will state the reasons of my dissent.”).
118. See CURRIE, supra note 25, at 201-81.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss1/3
p137 Kelsh.doc 05/20/99   11:43 AM
1999] OPINION DELIVERY PRACTICES 1790-1945 157
an interest was expressed throughout the Taney era. As time went on, however,
Justices began to mention it less frequently. Although Justice Taney in
particular continued to emphasize that dissent was acceptable in important
cases,119 by the Civil War120 these refrains were less commonly heard. The still-
low nonunanimity rates suggest that the Court had institutionalized a belief that
dissent was generally to be avoided, but Justices less frequently gave voice to
that belief.
There began, however, to develop another trend that was to have significant
consequences for the Court’s opinion-delivery practices. Justices began to state
that dissent was acceptable in order to protect or maintain their own records or
reputations. Justices began to defend dissent less by reference to the issues
involved and more by reference to themselves.
Concern with Consistency—A New Reason To Dissent
Up until approximately 1839, Justices who explained why they chose to
write separately nearly always placed their emphasis on the issue involved.
Beginning in approximately 1841, however, Justices started to express another
set of rationales for choosing to write separately.121 Justices frequently noted
that they wrote separately because they did not wish to be individually
associated with the majority’s opinion.
Two early examples of this appeared in the slavery case Groves v.
Slaughter.122 It is no surprise that the earliest expressions of concern for
consistency would arise in a case concerning slavery, the most contentious issue
of the day. In Groves Justice McLean raised in a concurrence a question the
majority had avoided: whether Congress had the power to regulate traffic in
slaves between the different states.123 Justice Taney stated in his concurrence
119. See, e.g., Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, 600-01 (1857) (Taney, C.J., dissenting) (“I
dissent. . . . The principle upon which the case is decided is so important, and will operate so widely, that I
feel it my duty to show the grounds upon which I differ. This will be done as briefly as I can . . . .”).
120. As Chart A shows, infra p. 175, nonunanimity rates during the Civil War were extremely low.
The decline in the frequency of the appearance of the importance rationale, however, began before the
Civil War drop-off in nonunanimity rates.
121. I do not mean to suggest that no Justice before 1839 ever expressed such a rationale. My point is
that before 1839 there was no regular pattern of Justices doing so. After 1839, there was such a pattern.
122. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841). It is perhaps significant that this early expression of concern for
individual consistency arose in a slavery case. Slavery cases were both constitutional in nature and of
great interest to the public—so it would have been appropriate anyway for Justices to write separately. See
supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text. Throughout the Taney period, the two common rationales for
expressing dissent often appeared together. See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 626
(1842) (Taney, C.J., concurring).
123. See Groves, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 506.
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that he had not originally intended to write separately, but now that Justice
McLean had stated his opinion on this question, Taney was “not willing, by
remaining silent, to leave any doubt as to [his own beliefs].”124 Justic  Baldwin
also expressed regret that Justice McLean had raised the unnecessary question.
He explained, however, that now that one of the Justices had raised the question,
he was “not willing to remain silent; lest it may be inferred that my opinion
coincides with that of the judges who have now expressed theirs.”125
As the Taney years went on, this rationale began to appear more frequently.
Many different Justices explained their decision to dissent in terms that echoed
those of Taney and Baldwin in Groves. In an 1853 case, Justice Catron
explained his decision to write separately: “[M]y object here is not to express an
opinion in this case further than to guard myself against being committed in any
degree to the [following] doctrine . . . .”126 The next year Justice Daniel
dissented briefly in a case involving admiralty jurisdiction. Daniel declined to
elaborate on his legal reasons for dissenting—saying that he had made them
clear in earlier cases. He closed his dissent by writing: “My purpose is simply to
maintain my own consistency in adhering to convictions which are in nowise
weakened.”127 Justice Grier used similar language in 1861: “I cannot consent,
by my silence, that an inference should be drawn that I concur in the opinion
just delivered.”128
This practice of justifying dissent by reference to a need to maintain
intellectual or ideological consistency was without precedent. Marshall-era
Justices justified dissent only by reference to the issue involved.129 Ta ey-era
Justices justifying dissent also made reference to the issue involved, but they
began as well to make reference to their own judicial reputations.130 These
124. Id. at 508.
125. Id. at 510.
126. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416, 442 (1853) (Catron, J.,
concurring).
127. The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152, 156 (1854) (Daniel, J.,
dissenting). Daniel, the Taney era’s most frequent dissenter, made this same assertion on numerous
occasions. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 135.
128. United States v. Vallejo, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 541, 555 (1861) (Grier, J., dissenting).
129. When they chose to justify it, that is. Frequently, they just launched right in to their argument on
the merits.
130. Taney-era Justices also developed a habit of justifying writing separately by reference to how far
off their opinions were from those of the majority. Justice Catron began an 1846 concurrence by writing,
“In this case, my opinion is founded on considerations that differ so much from those proceeded on in the
principal opinion . . . .” Smyth v. Strader, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 404, 417 (1846). This explanation for dissent
fits well with my thesis that the Taney era saw a shift in the Justices’ focus. Justices began to be less
concerned with the Court as a whole and more concerned with their individual roles.
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explanations for dissent suggest that Taney-era Justices began to conceive of
their role more as an individual effort and less as a part of a cohesive unit.131
Two other pieces of evidence from the opinion-delivery practices of the
Taney Court support this contention. First, the Taney period saw a dramatic
increase in the use of dissents and concurrences without opinion. The Marshall
Court had used these sparingly, registering a total of forty-one during its thirty-
five year run. By contrast, the Taney Court, which ran for thirty-three years,
registered 389.132 The dissent or concurrence without opinion is useful only as a
way of separating the individual Justice from the Court. It makes no effort to
convince future courts to adopt a different course or to persuade the current
majority to tighten its reasoning. It simply preserves for the public and for
history that this Justice disagreed. The increased use of the dissent and
concurrence without opinion demonstrates the Taney era’s increased emphasis
on the role and opinions of the individual Justices.
Second, the late Taney Court saw an increased incidence of hostility in
individual opinions. Marshall Court Justices had gone out of their way to
express their respect for the opinions of their brethren.133 During the Taney
Court, cordiality was still the norm, but during the Court’s later years Justices
occasionally began their separate opinions with expressions of scorn or disdain.
Separate opinions began to lack the civility that had marked the Marshall and
early Taney Courts. Justice Grier began an 1860 dissent:
I wholly dissent from the opinion of the majority of the court in this case,
both as to the law and the facts. But I do not think it necessary to
vindicate my opinion by again presenting to the public view a history of
the scandalous gossip which has been buried under the dust of half a
century, and which a proper feeling of delicacy should have suffered to
remain so . . . .134
Similarly, in 1854 Justice Daniel wrote:
In expressing my dissent, I shall not follow the protracted argument
throughout its entire length; my purpose is, chiefly, to free myself on any
131. This was perhaps inevitable, given the publicity and emotion that surrounded the dissents in
Dred Scott.
132. These numbers are taken from BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 5, at 137-41. The Taney
Court heard more cases per year than the Marshall Court, so the difference in the frequency of appearance
of these dissents and concurrences without opinion is not as stark as this comparison makes it seem.
133. See supra note 89.
134. Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 553, 631 (1860) (Grier, J., dissenting).
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future occasion from the trammels of an assent, either expressed or
implied, to what are deemed by me the untenable, and, in this case, the
irrelevant positions [of the majority].135
These expressions of disdain, which are also found in the opinions of other
Justices,136 are further evidence that the Taney-era Justices began to conceive of
the Court less as a unified whole and more as a collection of individuals.
Summary
The Taney Court inherited the Marshall Court’s practices and attitudes
regarding opinion delivery. These they left largely intact. Just as the Marshall
Court had, the Taney Court delivered its opinions through one Justice speaking
for the Court with other Justices free to dissent or concur. In addition, the Taney
Court adopted the Marshall Court’s belief that dissent was particularly
appropriate in important cases.
The Taney Court differed from the Marshall Court, however, in one
important respect. The Taney Court developed a belief that dissent was
acceptable to protect an individual Justice’s record. This belief was part of a
larger Taney Court trend toward conceiving of the Court more as nine
individuals and less as a cohesive whole. This trend was to accelerate over time.




At first glance, it appears the Court’s opinion-delivery practices changed
little in the period between Chief Justice Taney’s death in 1864 and Harlan
Fiske Stone’s elevation to Chief Justice in 1941. The Court continued to present
its opinions in the format it had settled on during the Marshall period.138 The
135. Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 396 (1854) (Daniel, J., concurring in the
judgment).
136. See, e.g., Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 207 (1863) (Miller, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he principle on which the court rests its decision is one, not only essentially wrong . . . but
one which, if steadily adhered to in future, may lead to consequences of the most serious character.”);
United States v. Boisdore, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 63, 103 (1850) (Wayne, J., dissenting) (“I dissent from . . .
every position of fact or argument in the opinion of the court . . . .”).
137. Specifically, it was an important precondition for the mid-twentieth century boom in
nonunanimity rates. See infra notes 234-59 and accompanying text.
138. For a discussion of the history of the Marshall Court’s opinion-delivery practices, see supra
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average nonunanimity rate per term was 18%, very comparable to the Taney
Court’s 20%.139 Justices of the period frequently echoed their Taney-era
predecessors in expressing their reluctance to dissent.140
Despite these superficial similarities, this period saw a significant change in
the attitude Justices took toward writing separately. First, the Justices expanded
the universe of cases where dissent was appropriate. While the Justices still said
that dissent was acceptable in “important” cases, they also said that writing
separately was justified when a case had significant practical consequences, or
when the majority ignored stare decisis, or when they just plain disagreed.141
Second, Justices between 1864 and 1940 continued the trend towards viewing
the Court more as atomized and less as unified. Citation to the views of
individual Justices became more and more frequent and the Court developed
distinct ideological blocs. Third, there was an increased sense that dissents were
a legitimate and important source of law. Justices began to distinguish between
unanimous and nonunanimous cases, citations to dissents for propositions of
law became more frequent, and several dissents were written into law. All of
these changes laid the groundwork for the post-1941 explosion in nonunanimity
rates.
General Similarities
In three important respects, opinion-delivery practices between 1864 and
1940 were remarkably stable. First and foremost, the form the Court used for
presenting its opinions changed very little. Just as the Taney and Marshall
Courts had, the Court in this era decided the great majority of its cases by the
opinion of a single Justice speaking for the Court, with other Justices free to
concur or dissent on their own. While the predominant form remained largely
the same, the Court did develop a few relatively insignificant innovations. This
era saw the development of the plurality opinion,142 the practice of Justices
concurring in part and dissenting in part,143 and a sharp increase in the number
notes 36-90 and accompanying text. For a discussion of three minor structural changes that took place
between 1864-1940, see infra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 152-71 and accompanying text.
142. This actually was not much of a change. There were only 18 of these issued prior to 1938. By
contrast, there were 15 issued in 1970 alone. See John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical
Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 60.
143. See, e.g., Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438, 457 (1898) (Shiras, J., dissenting in
part); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 82 (1911) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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of cases disposed of with per curiam opinions.144
Second, the Justices seemed to have retained, at least for most of the
period,145 the idea that writing separately was generally to be avoided. Justices
throughout the period introduced their separate opinions by announcing their
“regret” at having to write separately.146 Th y spoke of their “respect” for the
opinions of their brethren.147 Justices frequently explained why they chose to
write separately, the implication being that in the ordinary case it was to be
avoided.148 Justice Holmes captured this sentiment when he began his first
dissent, “I think it useless and undesirable, as a rule, to express dissent . . . .”149
Third, the Court’s nonunanimity rate for nearly this entire period was very
similar to that of the Taney Court. The Taney Court’s nonunanimity rate was
20%—the nonunanimity rate for the 1864-1940 period was 18%.150 The most
unusual thing about the nonunanimity rate for the 1864-1940 period is that the
last ten years saw a sustained increase. This rate was to shoot up dramatically
in the first years of the Stone Court, but the beginnings of the rise can be seen
around 1930.
Structurally, everything looked the same. When one looks at the rationales
the Justices were giving for their decision to dissent, however, it is clear that
significant changes had taken place.
Rationales
1. Case-Specific Rationales
144. See BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 5, at 137-41.
145. It is hard to know what the Justices thought about separate opinions during the 1930s. By then,
they had all but stopped explaining why they chose to write separately.
146. See, e.g., James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 161 (1937) (Roberts, J., dissenting);
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 650 (1895) (White, J., dissenting); Texas v. White,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 737 (1868) (Grier, J., dissenting).
147. See, e.g., Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 169 (1925) (Sutherland, J., dissenting); Evans v.
National Bank, 251 U.S. 108, 117 (1919) (Pitney, J., dissenting).
148. For a description of the rationalizations Justices of this era used to justify their decision to write
separately, see infra notes 152-71 and accompanying text.
149. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). While
sentiments such as these were expressed often, it is important to note that many, many separate opinions in
this era began right in with a discussion of the issue, without any explanation of the Justice’s decision to
dissent. Furthermore, explanations for dissent had all but disappeared by the second half of the 1930s.
This is interesting, because this is also the only time during this 77-year period that there is a sustained
increase in the nonunanimity rate. This correlation is further support for my general thesis that changes in
judicial attitudes toward dissent were at least partly responsible for the sharp increase in the nonunanimity
rate during the Stone Court. See infra notes 234-59 and accompanying text.
150. Nonunanimity rates for 1800-1992 period are shown in Chart A, infra p. 175.
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Just as the Justices of the Taney Court had, Justices during the 1864-1940
period frequently explained why they chose to write separately. As was the case
with the Taney period, these explanations can be divided into two categories—
those that pertained to the particular case, and those that pertained to the
particular Justice.151 Case-specific rationales will be treated in this subsection.
Justice-specific rationales will be treated in the next.
The Justices of the 1864-1940 era inherited most of the case-specific
rationales that Justices had expressed during the Taney era. As was the case
during that period, the most frequent rationale for writing separately was that
the case before the Court was “important.” Justices used this excuse in dozens
of cases throughout the period.152 On some occasions, Justices indicated that it
was the “importance” of the legal principles involved that warranted dissent.153
More frequently, however, Justices simply stated that the case was important
without providing any explanation as to what made it so. Justice Field’s 1891
statement is typical of this style, “I concur . . . . As a correct solution of the
questions involved is of vital importance . . . I will venture to make some
observations, in addition to those of my brethren . . . .”154
Justices of this era also followed the Taney Court in explaining that dissent
was appropriate in constitutional cases.155 This rationale was not expressed
frequently, but it never completely disappeared. In 1872 Justice Bradley said,
“On a constitutional question involving the powers of the government it is
proper that . . . no member of the court should hesitate to express his views.”156
Justice Frankfurter made a similar point in 1939:
I join in the Court’s opinion but deem it appropriate to add a few
remarks. The volume of the Court’s business has long since made
impossible the early healthy practice whereby the Justices gave
151. See supra notes 103-33 and accompanying text for a description of the Taney Court Justices’
explanations for writing separately.
152. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448 (1934) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Williams, 214 U.S. 492, 495 (1909) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 449 (1902) (Gray, J., dissenting); The Great Western,
118 U.S. 520, 526 (1886) (Matthews, J., dissenting); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 634
(1871) (Field, J., dissenting).
153. See, e.g., Tyler v. Campbell, 106 U.S. 322, 323 (1882); Woodson v. Murdock, 89 U.S. (22
Wall.) 351, 374 (1874).
154. Knight v. United States Land Ass’n, 142 U.S. 161, 189-90 (1891).
155. Justice Brandeis spoke of the need for dissent in constitutional cases, saying “what is done is
what you call statesmanship, [and hence] is never settled.” Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The
Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 583, 608 (1994)
(citation omitted).
156. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 554 (Bradley, J., concurring).
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expression to individual opinions. But the old tradition still has relevance
when an important shift in constitutional doctrine is announced . . . .157
The one case-specific rationale that the Justices of this era did not carry over
from the Taney Court was the belief that dissent was appropriate in cases in
which the public had a great interest.158 This popular Taney-era idea was rarely,
if ever, expressed by Justices in the post-Taney years.
Post-Taney Justices did not, however, limit themselves to the categories of
cases that Taney-era Justices believed warranted dissent. As the years went by,
they developed three other rationales for writing separately. These new
rationales existed side by side with the rationales they inherited from the Taney
Court. The effect was to expand greatly the universe of cases for which dissent
was considered appropriate.159
The first new rationale was that the “consequences” of a particular case
justified writing separately. Justices frequently opened separate opinions with
references to the “far-reaching,”160 “grave,”161 “injurious,”162 “serious,”163 or
“alarming”164 consequences of the Court’s opinion. Consequences such as these,
the Justices often argued, justified the delivery of a separate opinion. Justice
Pitney’s 1917 statement is a good example of this genre: “I deem it proper, in
view of the momentous consequences of the decision, to present some additional
considerations.”165
157. Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 487 (1939) (Frankfurther, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted). This statement came in Frankfurter’s second concurrence. He of course was not correct
that the Court abandoned the seriatim style because of the pressures generated by increasing case volumes.
See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
159. This expansion in the universe of cases, of course, did not result in a significant increase in the
actual rate of dissent until the early 1930s. Even if the categories of cases in which a Justice could dissent
expanded, Justices still shared the belief that dissent was not desirable. This kept nonunanimity rates low.
Harlan Fiske Stone was aggressive in attacking this reluctance to dissent during his early years as Chief
Justice. See Thomas G. Walker et al., On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United
States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361 (1988). This attitude shift was important, but it would not have
had the effect it had unless this complementary shift in belief—that dissent was not limited to a certain
subset of cases—had not already occurred. If Chief Justice Stone’s change in attitude was the spark that
started the inferno of dissent, the attitude shifts described in this section were the kindling.
160. Freeport Water Co. v. Freeport City, 180 U.S. 587, 601 (1901) (White, J., dissenting).
161. Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 237 (1901) (White, J., dissenting).
162. Kean v. Calumet Canal & Improvement Co., 190 U.S. 452, 461 (1903) (White, J., dissenting).
163. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 400 (1913) (Hughes, J., dissenting).
164. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 511 (1913) (Lurton, J., dissenting).
165. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 223 (1917) (Pitney, J., dissenting). Sometimes the
Justices did not justify dissent by vague references to categories of consequences (that is, “grave” or
“alarming”), but rather by the specific consequences of the case at hand. For example, a number of
Justices said that a case with consequences for a person’s life or liberty justified writing separately. See,
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A second major new rationale that the Justices developed during this period
was that it was appropriate to register dissent when the majority departed from
principles established by earlier cases. Justices announced in several cases that
they had a “duty” to call attention to the Court’s disregard of its own
precedents.166
A corollary to this idea that dissent was acceptable to protect stare decisis
was the principle that dissent was appropriate when the dissenter believed the
majority’s errant opinion had the potential to affect many other cases. This idea
did not clearly emerge until 1912.167 Justice Brandeis stated it clearly in 1927:
Mere difference of opinion in the construction of intricate statutes can
rarely justify expression of dissent. This is especially true where the two
views lead, in the particular case, to the same result. But, in this instance,
the construction adopted by the Court may have in other cases . . .
regrettable results.168
The third and final new justification for writing separately was the least
restrictive of the three. In a number of cases, Justices announced that they were
going to state their views separately for no reason other than that they disagreed
with the majority of the Court. This rationale, which is really no rationale at all,
was a particular favorite of Justice Harlan’s. He concluded an 1892 dissent by
stating: “Believing the doctrine announced by the court to be unsound, upon
principle and authority, [I] do not feel at liberty to withhold an expression of
[my] dissent from the opinion.”169
The development of these new rationales for expressing dissent significantly
enlarged the universe of cases in which dissent was considered appropriate.
e.g., Valdez v. United States, 244 U.S. 432, 446 (1917) (Clarke, J., dissenting) (“I greatly regret that I
cannot concur . . . and the fact that the decision must cost two men their lives impels me to state as briefly
as I may my reasons for dissenting from it.”); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 461 (1912) (Lamar, J.,
dissenting) (“[t]he fact that the defendant’s liberty is involved . . . justifies a brief statement of . . . this
dissent.”).
166. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 746 (1882) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Having a
deep conviction that the opinion of the court is in conflict with the spirit and tenor of our former decisions
. . . I deem it my duty to dissent from it.”); Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co., 107 U.S. 378, 396 (1882)
(Miller, J., dissenting) (“The decision of the court . . . is so wide a departure from the former practice in
similar cases . . . that I feel it to be my duty to dissent . . . .”). This rationale was often expressed in
conjunction with at least one other. See, e.g., Freeport Water Co. v. Freeport City, 180 U.S. 587, 601
(1901) (White, J., dissenting) (“The far-reaching consequences which must result from the principles upon
which this case is decided, and the conflict between those principles and what I conceive to be previous
well-settled rules of law, impel me to state the reasons for my dissent.”).
167. See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 461 (1912) (Lamar, J., dissenting).
168. Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 512 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
169. Brenham v. German Am. Bank, 144 U.S. 173, 197 (1892) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Justices were no longer limited to the Taney-era category of important cases,170
with importance being defined by the presence of a constitutional question or
public interest. The new categories were significantly broader than the old ones
had been. The number of cases that presented a constitutional issue or a
question of interest to the public was limited by factors external to the Justices
themselves; the new categories were not. Justices could decide for themselves,
on any type of case presented to them, that the consequences were serious, or
that the majority had ignored stare decisis, or that their disagreement was
intense enough. These new rationales, taken together, seemed to suggest that
dissent was acceptable in any type of case at all. The subject matter of a case no
longer needed to be referenced in deciding whether to write separately.
Given this great broadening in the categories of cases in which dissent was
acceptable, one would expect that the Justices would have stopped justifying
their decisions to write separately. This is, in fact, what happened. Between
1930-40, Justices rarely offered these excuses.171
One would also expect that this significant broadening of the categories of
cases for which dissent was acceptable would lead to a great increase in the
nonunanimity rate. To some extent this happened, in that the nonunanimity rate
jumped between 1930-40. A far more substantial rise, however, was to occur in
the years following 1941, long after these new post-Taney rationales had
become established. The explanation for this anomaly is that these new
rationales for which types of cases warranted dissent coexisted with the general
belief that dissent was to be avoided.172 Th  tension between these two ideas173
kept the nonunanimity rate from rising too high.174
2. Justice-Oriented Rationales—“Consistency”
The second major explanation that Taney-era Justices offered for choosing
170. For a definition of “important,” see supra notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
171. There were some exceptions to this. Frankfurter occasionally made reference to the
constitutional question rationale, see, e.g., Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 487
(1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and Black opened one of his initial dissents with an expression of the
importance rationale. See McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U.S. 419, 423 (1938) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
172. Chief Justices prior to Stone had carried on a “no dissent unless absolutely necessary” tradition.
Walker et al., supra note 159, at 382 (citations omitted).
173. The two ideas are (1) that dissent was acceptable in a wide range of cases and (2) that dissent
was generally to be avoided.
174. For a discussion of the post-1941 explosion in dissent rates, see infra notes 234-59 and
accompanying text.
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to write separately was that they needed to be consistent.175 Justices of en stated
that they needed to write separately to protect their own records or to show that
they were personally repulsed by the Court’s opinion.176 The expression of these
rationales was part of a larger Taney-era movement toward a conception of the
Court less as a unified whole and more as a collection of nine individuals.177 As
was true with the case-specific rationales, Justices of the post-Taney era
inherited these beliefs and pushed them in new directions.178
Justices throughout the 1864-1940 period echoed their Taney-era
predecessors in stating that dissent was appropriate to explain or protect one’s
record. Justices frequently stated that they were choosing to write separately to
make it clear that they, as individuals, had no part in the majority’s opinion.
Justice Bradley opened an 1873 concurrence by saying:
Whilst I concur in the conclusion to which the court has arrived in this
case, I think it proper to state briefly and explicitly the grounds on which
I distinguish it from the Slaughter-House Cases . . . . I prefer to do this
in order that there may be no misapprehension of the views which I
entertain in regard to the application of the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution.179
Justice Field echoed him fourteen years later:
I . . . make this special concurrence in the opinion of the majority because
of language in it expressing approval of the positions taken by the court
in Louisiana v. Jumel, from which I dissented . . . . I adhere to my
dissenting opinions in those cases, and in concurring in the judgment in
this case I do not in any respect depart from or qualify what I there
said.180
Justices throughout this period used this need to maintain consistency as an
175. See supra notes 121-36 and accompanying text.
176. See id.
177. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
178. It is important to re-emphasize here that Justices frequently did not explain why they felt
justified in dissenting.
179. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 135 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring). The Justices
who dissented in the Slaughter-House Cases seem to have been particularly worried that their views were
being misrepresented. Concurring in this same case, Justice Field wrote, “[A]s there has been some
apparent misapprehension of the views of the dissenting judges in the Slaughter-House Cases, I feel
called upon to restate the grounds of their dissent.” Id. at 141.
180. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 509-10 (1887) (Field, J., concurring).
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excuse for stating their opinions separately.181
The Justices also followed the example of the Taney Court in writing that
the majority’s opinion was so repulsive to them that they had no choice but to
dissent. For example, Justice Miller wrote in 1873, “I regret to have to dissent,
but I think the precedent of making laws in this manner too pernicious to be
acquiesced in by my silence.”182 Justice Brewer sounded a similar note thirty-
two years later: “I am unable to concur in the foregoing opinion, and, believing
that a grievous wrong is done . . . will state the reasons for my dissent.”183
It was noted above that this pattern of using separate opinions to clarify a
Justice’s own record was part of a shift during the Taney period toward
conceiving of the Court less as a cohesive unit and more as a collection of nine
individuals.184 Other evidence from separate opinions between 1864-1940
suggests that this trend accelerated during this era.
First, Justices often used the separate opinion as a forum to discuss their
own views on a particular area of law.185 For example, Chief Justice Chase
181. See also Pound v. Turck, 95 U.S. 459, 465 (1877) (Clifford, J., concurring).
182. Sykes v. Chadwick, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 141, 151 (1873).
183. San Francisco Nat’l Bank v. Dodge, 197 U.S. 70, 89 (1905) (Brewer, J., dissenting). Opinions
of this sort occasionally included biting and sarcastic descriptions of the majority’s opinion. These
comments are sometimes humorous. Justice Brown started a dissent by writing: “I concur in the opinion of
the court that the question involved in this case needs little more than its bare statement to indicate the
answer that should be made to it. But I do not concur in the answer made by the court.” Swan Land &
Cattle Co. v. Frank, 148 U.S. 603, 613 (1893). Justice Field started an 1871 dissent as follows:
It is . . . with diffidence that I venture to dissent . . . a diffidence which is greatly augmented by the
declaration of the majority, that it is impossible to escape the conclusion which they have reached.
But for this conclusion I should have supposed that it would have been impossible . . . to obtain a
decree confiscating the property of a citizen . . . .
Henderson’s Distilled Spirits, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 44, 65 (1871) (Field, J., dissenting). Justice McKenna
introduced his understanding of the majority’s opinion in a 1924 case by stating, “Let me state the
proposition of the [majority] opinion denuded of the confusion of its words.” United States v. New River
Co., 265 U.S. 533, 543 (1924).
184. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
185. It is also possible that the increased attention the Justices paid to the consistency and
development of their own views was the result of change in the nature of the commentary on the Court.
Prior to the twentieth century, the dominant form of legal commentary had been the treatise. Early treatise
writers attempted to synthesize entire bodies of law and relied heavily on English cases. See Michael I.
Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins, Founding, and Early Development of Student-Edited
Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 739, 745 (1985). The Supreme Court, presumably, was not a major
focus of these treatises. By 1930 nearly 43 law schools had law reviews, and non-treatise-style academic
writing was the dominant form of legal commentary. See id. at 787. The rise of the law review format
likely resulted in increased analysis of Supreme Court opinions. Earlier forms of legal commentary had
either focused on the development of the common law, see id. at 742-48, in which the Court had played
little role, or the personalities and events of local bars. See id. at 750-55. The change in the format of
specialized legal commentary meant that the Court was subject to more analysis. The increased analysis
perhaps meant that Justices were more eager to make sure that their views were properly understood.
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spent several pages in his Legal Tender Cases dissent explaining why his
position in that case was not inconsistent with the position he had taken as
Secretary of the Treasury.186 Justice Brewer wrote in a 1904 dissent, “I have
heretofore dissented in several cases involving the exclusion or expulsion of the
Chinese . . . my views on the questions are unchanged.”187 Justice Stone opened
a 1930 dissent by writing “I agree with . . . Mr. Justice Holmes . . . but as I
concurred, on special grounds, with the result in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v.
Minnesota and Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, I would say a word of the
application now given to those precedents.”188 Justices throughout the period
clearly thought it important that there be no mistake as to the views that they, as
individuals, had on certain legal questions.
Second, just as individual Justices began to pay more attention to their own
records, so too did they begin to pay more attention to the records and analyses
of other Justices.189 Justices began with greater frequency to link propositions of
law with the Justice who spoke for the Court, rather than saying simply that the
proposition had come from the Court itself. Sometimes reference to a specific
Justice was made to bolster the legal point being made. Justice Nelson argued
for his view of an issue by noting: “We have, therefore, the deliberate opinions
of Marshall, and Taney, and Story concurring in this construction . . . .”190
Other times, the views of a particular Justice were explored to see which way
the Court would have gone on a specific issue.191 What ver the purpose,192
186. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 575-77 (1871) (Chase, C.J., dissenting).
187. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 171 (1904) (Brewer, J., dissenting). The Chinese
Exclusion Cases, which sprang up around the end of the nineteenth century, sparked some of the most
passionate dissents of the entire era. See, e.g., Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. at 170; Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 732, 744, 761 (1893).
188. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 596 (1930) (Stone, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
189. This, perhaps, was not all that new. Recall how Justice Story noted in two of his 1837 dissents
that Chief Justice Marshall would have agreed with him had he still been alive. See Briscoe v. Bank of
Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257, 328 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S.
(11 Pet.) 102, 160 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting). Perhaps the respect a particular line of analysis has been
accorded has always been contingent on the Justice who authored it. It seems, however, that concern with
the expressions of particular Justices became more intense in this period.
190. Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 147 (1868) (Nelson, J., dissenting); see also
Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379, 398 (1931) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (noting in detail
the views of then Judge Cardozo).
191. See, e.g., Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Washington Airport, Inc., 283 U.S. 348, 350 (1931),
where Justice Holmes wrote “[w]ith regard to that it is to be noticed that Mr. Justice Day, who wrote the
earlier decision, took part also in the later and seems to have agreed with it.” See also Brass v. North
Dakota ex rel. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391, 405 (1894) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“It is a significant fact that in
Sinking Fund Cases, and in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway v. Illinois, Mr. Justice Bradley and Mr.
Justice Miller, who concurred in the judgment in Munn v. Illinois, each sought to limit and qualify the
scope of the language used by the Chief Justice in that case.” (citations omitted)).
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during this period more and more emphasis was placed on what individual
Justices thought.193
The third piece of evidence from separate opinions that the Court was
becoming more atomized was the development of ideological blocs.194 For most
of the Court’s history, a great majority of the separate writings had been penned
by a handful of Justices, who nearly always wrote only for themselves. Justices
Johnson, Daniel, Clifford, and Harlan were each the dominant dissenter of their
times, and they usually operated alone. By the twentieth century, however,
subgroups of Justices developed.195 These tandems, first Holmes and Brandeis,
later Holmes, Stone, and Brandeis, and later still the Four Horsemen,196 seemed
to set themselves off from the rest of the Court. These blocs had a particular
point to make, and they used separate opinions to repeat that point over and
over. Dissents by Holmes very frequently emphasized that the Court was not
authorized to act as a superlegislature.197 The Four Horsemen repeatedly
emphasized the limited regulatory powers of state governments.198 The
development of these blocs, which is seen most clearly in the pattern of the
separate opinions, made the Court appear less as a unified whole searching for
truth and more as a collection of factions, each struggling for votes.199
The cumulative effect of all of these developments was to make the Court
much more focused on the views of the individual Justice than it had ever been.
The Legal Realist perspective, which had come to dominate the academy from
which so many of these Justices had been drawn, now dominated the Court as
192. It should be noted that this development was not at all limited to separate opinions. Majority
opinions also made more frequent reference to the views of specific Justices.
193. One particularly funny example of this took place in 1888 when Chief Justice Fuller announced
that a majority of the Court “adhered to the views expressed by Mr. Justice Harlan in the opinion of the
court in this case delivered at the last term.” Marshall v. United States, 131 U.S. 391, 391 (1888). Justice
Harlan then wrote a dissent saying that he now believed that his opinion from the previous year was
wrong. See id. at 392 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
194. Thank you to Peter Wall and Eric Wunsch for first bringing this to my attention.
195. C. Herman Pritchett’s influential 1948 book, The Roosevelt Court, details how the Court had
split into liberal and conservative camps in the years preceding 1941. See C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE
ROOSEVELT COURT 32-45 (1948). Pritchett details how the liberal-conservative split played itself out in
areas as diverse as labor, crime, and economic regulation. See id. at 253-63.
196. The Four Horesemen were Justices Pierce Butler, Willis Van Devanter, George Sutherland, and
James McReynolds.
197. See, e.g., Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
198. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 430 (1937) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting).
199. G. Edward White wrote that the Marshall Court’s concern with unanimity was at least in part
attributable to the view of the day that law was found and not made. See White, supra note 30, at 47. By
the 1930s Legal Realism held sway. The view of Legal Realism was just the opposite. The competing
factions conception of the Court fits well with the Legal Realist conception of law.
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well. Law was no longer considered to be found, rather it was made.200 Given
this shift in conception of law, an increased focus on individual Justices was
inevitable. By the end of this period, the Court had moved even further from
Marshall’s conception of a unified Court and closer to what Justice Holmes
purportedly referred to as “nine scorpions trapped in a bottle.”201 As will b
explained later, the increasing importance attached to the views of the individual
Justices was an important precursor to the post-1941 explosion in the issuance
of dissent.
Acceptance of Dissent
There was a final important development in the history of the Court’s
opinion-delivery practices that took place during this period. To an extent never
before seen, during the 1864-1940 period separate opinions became a widely-
accepted part of the legal culture. Justices began to view separate opinions as
having an important and legitimate role in the process of deciding cases. Four
pieces of evidence demonstrate this point.
The first202 is the frequent reference by Justices to whether or not a relied-
upon case had been decided unanimously. Justice McReynolds in Myers v.
United States203 attempted to make a point by noting anachronistically that
Marbury v. Madison had been “concurred in by all.”204 A few years later he
used the opposite tactic, noting that “[t]he plan under review in the Legal
Tender Cases was declared within the limits of the Constitution, but not without
a strong dissent.”205 The point of these references, presumably, was that
unanimous precedents were stronger than disputed precedents. Separate
opinions thus played an important and legitimate role in distinguishing between
strong and weak precedents.
200. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV.
L. REV. 1222, 1236 (1931).
201. See ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK 322 (1994). In a similar vein, Justice Powell later
described the Court as “nine small, independent law firms.” DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 122 (1986).
202. The first sign might not have come from the Justices at all. The Reporter for volume 71
explained that Congress had authorized the previous year’s cases to be printed in two volumes rather than
the traditional one. The Reporter noted that “[o]ne purpose of Congress [in providing for two volumes]
was that the great constitutional questions in which opinions had been given at the late term—questions on
which professional, public, and even judicial opinion, as was known, had been much divided—should be
reported with more than usual fulness.” John William Wallace, Preface, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) ix (1867).
Congress wanted these dissents to be made more available to the public. It would not have done this did it
not believe that the dissenting opinion was an important part of the legal culture.
203. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
204. Id. at 215 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
205. Gold Clause Cases, 294 U.S. 240, 369 (1935) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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The second piece of evidence that separate opinions had come to be regarded
as an accepted and legitimate part of the legal culture was the increased
frequency with which Justices began citing them. Justices started citing both
their own separate opinions and those of other Justices. Justices would use
citations of their own separate opinions as a way of bolstering or establishing
their record on a particular issue. In separate opinions, Justices were freed from
the burden of having to tailor their thinking to win the approval of the other
Justices. This made them the best possible reference points for Justices eager to
explain their own thinking. For example, Justice Brewer opened an 1894 dissent
by noting:
I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court in this case.
Reliance is placed in that opinion on Munn v. Illinois, and Budd v. New
York. In the dissenting opinion I filed in the latter case, I expressed, so far
as was necessary, my views in reference to the general propositions laid
down in the two cases, and I do not desire to repeat what I there said.206
Another example is Justice Cardozo’s Schechter Poultry concurrence,207 i
which he took great care to reconcile his position with what he said in his
Panama Refining Co. dissent.208
Justices also cited frequently to the separate opinions of other Justices.
Sometimes they did so to show where the Court stood on a particular issue.
Dissents and concurrences provided occasional hints as to the thinking of
particular Justices on specific issues.209 More frequently, Justices would cite to
separate opinions for propositions of law. In many of these instances, Justices
seemed to give as much weight to separate opinions as would be given to
opinions for the Court. Justice Brewer opened an 1891 dissent:
I dissent . . . . The main proposition upon which [the judgment and
opinion] rest is, in my judgment, radically unsound. It is the doctrine of
Munn v. Illinois reaffirmed. . . . The elaborate discussions of the
question in the dissenting opinions in that case . . . seem to forbid
206. Brass v. North Dakota ex rel. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391, 405 (1894) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
207. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (Cardozo, J.,
concurring).
208. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
209. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text; see also Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197,
238 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“In these views the minority in Downes v. Bidwell, constituting four
other members of this court, substantially concurred.”).
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anything more than a general declaration of dissent.210
Brewer’s citation to a dissent was somewhat rare for the nineteenth century.
This practice did not become popular until somewhat later. In 1926 Justice
McReynolds wrote in dissent: “In an elaborate dissent Mr. Justice Field, Mr.
Justice Gray and Mr. Justice Brown expressed the view that it was beyond the
President’s power to remove the judge of any court during the term for which
appointed. They necessarily repudiated the doctrine of illimitable power.”211
In Untermyer v. Anderson,212 Justice Brandeis quoted Justice Holmes’
statement in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital on the “vague contours of the Fifth
Amendment,” without noting that Justice Holmes had dissented in Adkins.213 In
his concurring opinion in W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas,214 Justice Sutherland
argued that the “reasons set forth in the dissenting opinion in the Blaisdell case
and the long line of cases . . . there cited, fully support this conclusion.”215 By
the end of this period, Justices oftentimes made no distinction between
propositions of law stated by the Court and propositions of law stated by a
Justice writing for himself.216
The third indication that the separate opinion had become more widely
accepted was the relative infrequency with which Justices offered explanations
for their decisions to dissent. By the 1930s the familiar judicial language of
regret, reluctance, and diffidence217 had all but disappeared. The absence of
such explanations suggests that Justices had fully accepted the view that
separate opinions had a legitimate role in the American legal system.
The fourth and most compelling sign that separate opinions were now
viewed as playing an important role was that during this period, several separate
opinions were written into law, either by statute or by subsequent overruling of
the opinion for the Court. A number of these elevations of dissent occurred on
issues of great public concern. The first and most significant example of this
210. Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 548-49 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
211. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 225 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
212. 276 U.S. 440 (1928).
213. Id. at 454 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 568
(1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
214. 292 U.S. 426 (1934).
215. Id. at 434 (Sutherland, J., concurring).
216. This practice, of course, still continues. For examples, look to Justice Jackson’s famous
concurrence on the separation of powers in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634
(1952), and the second Justice Harlan’s Fourth Amendment concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 396 (1967). Both of these opinions became more famous than the majority opinions they
accompanied.
217. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
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was the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, which overturned Dred Scott218
and vindicated Justice Curtis’ dissent. Other examples abound. The Legal
Tender Cases,219 which upheld the validity of paper money in 1872,
overruled220 Hepburn v. Griswold.221 Hepburn had been delivered in 1870 over
a strong dissent.222 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,223 which dealt with
the power of the President to remove executive branch officials, rejected the
logic of Myers v. United States.224 Myers had featured an elaborate, eighteen-
section dissent from Justice McReynolds.225 Cases such as Nebbia v. New
York226 were a sub silentio endorsement of Holmes’ dissent in Lochner v. New
York.227 Justices seemed to be saving their best efforts for their separate
opinions.228 More and more, these separate opinions were ultimately
triumphing.229 This is the strongest possible evidence that they were now
accepted as a legitimate and important part of the American legal system.230
Summary
This Section started by noting the continuities in opinion-delivery practices
between the Taney era and the period between 1864-1940. The Justices retained
the opinion-delivery form that had been developed during the Marshall period,
they continued to express a reluctance to write separately, and the nonunanimity
218. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
219. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
220. Id. at 553.
221. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
222. More important, of course, than the strength of the dissent was the appointment to the Court—on
the same day the Hepburn decision was announced—of two new Justices, William Strong and Joseph
Bradley, both of whom supported the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Acts. See BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 157-58 (1993). Hepburn had been decided by an eight
Justice Court that split 5-3. With the addition of Strong and Bradley, and the departure of Justice Grier,
who had sided with the Hepburn majority, the Legal Tender Cases majority overruled Hepburn in a 5-4
decision.
223. 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935).
224. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
225. Id. at 182-239.
226. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
227. 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
228. Think for a moment about the career of Justice Holmes. He is known as one of the greatest
Justices of all time, but nearly all of his famous opinions are dissents or concurrences. It is hard to think of
a single majority opinion of Holmes that is as well-remembered as his dissents in Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905), Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918), or Northern Securities Co.
v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904).
229. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and the whole “revolution” of
1937.
230. This account leaves out what is probably the most famous dissent of all time—that of Justice
Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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rate remained about the same.
A close look at the separate opinions of the period reveals, however, that
several important changes took place. First, the Justices greatly expanded the
universe of cases in which dissent was considered acceptable.231 Second, more
attention was paid to the thinking of individual Justices.232 Third, eparate
opinions had come to play an important and respected role in the American legal
system.233 All of these changes were important precursors of the explosion in
dissent rates that was soon to occur.
E. The Stone Court
In 1941 Harlan Fiske Stone assumed leadership of a Court whose opinion-
delivery practices had been stable for well over a century. There had been no
significant change in the form in which opinions were delivered since the
Marshall period. The rate at which these opinions were presented unanimously
had also been remarkably constant.
The Stone Court, however, saw the beginnings of a significant change.
While the form used to present opinions stayed the same, the rate at which
dissent was expressed increased dramatically. Two statistics capture the
significance of the Stone Court shift. The first is the nonunanimity rate, which is
shown in Chart A.234 As the Chart reveals, the nonunanimity rate was relatively
constant between the beginning of the Marshall Court and the early 1930s.235
From the early 1930s through 1940 the rate rose slowly but steadily. Beginning
in 1941, however, the rate exploded. It peaked at 86% in 1947.236 It has hovered
around 75% ever since.237
231. See supra notes 152-74 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 202-30 and accompanying text.
234. This number, as well as all others, excludes per curiam opinions.
235. There is one aberrational increase in 1837 and 1838. During those years, Justice Baldwin issued
a large number of dissents and concurrences without opinion.
236. This number and all numbers before 1947 are from the author’s own count. Nonunanimity rates
for subsequent years are taken from the Harvard Law Review’s annual collection of statistics on the
Supreme Court.
237. The rate fell to 58% in both 1963 and 1967.
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The second statistic that shows this dramatic change is the ratio of separate
opinions to opinions of the Court.238 This statistic, which has not yet been
discussed, is shown in Chart B. As was the case with the nonunanimity rate, this
number was remarkably stable between 1800 and 1940.239
Chart B

















238. These statistics exclude per curiam opinions and dissents and concurrences without opinion.
239. This is not to say that there had not been any variations. During the first few years of the
Marshall Court there were no separate opinions, so the rate was zero. In the years immediately preceeding
1941 there was a gradual, but steady, increase in the frequency of separate writings. This uptick may be
attributable in part to the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994)), which gave the Justices greater control over their docket. See infra notes
245-47 and accompanying text.
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The following table240 gives the ratio of separate opinions to majority
opinions during each of the following Chief Justice’s tenure:
John Marshall .07    
Roger B. Taney .18    
Salmon P. Chase .12    
Morrison R. Waite .08    
Melville W. Fuller .12    
Edward D. White .07    
William H. Taft .10    
Charles E. Hughes    .17
As was the case with the nonunanimity rate, however, the 1941 Term was
the beginning of a dramatic change. In 1941 the separate opinion to majority
opinion ratio jumped from .19 to .34. The ratio continued to climb until 1948,
when it topped 1.0 for the first time, meaning that the total number of dissents
and concurrences in 1948 was higher than the total number of opinions for the
Court.241 As Chart B indicates, the ratio hovered around 1.0 between 1948 and
1966 and has not dropped below that mark in any subsequent term.242
240. These statistics are taken from BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 5, at 137-41.
241. The Justices developed two new practices during the Stone Court that contributed to this rise.
First, they began to write concurrences for the explicit purpose of responding to points made in dissents.
See, e.g., Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 619 (1944) (Black, J. and
Murphy, J., concurring) (“We agree with the Court’s opinion and would add nothing to what has been
said but for what is patently a wholly gratuitous assertion as to Constitutional law in the dissent of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter.”); New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Frank, 314 U.S. 360, 373 (1941)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (“While I agree with the opinion of the Court, I think an elaboration of the point,
which is the nub of the case, is desirable in view of certain observations in the dissenting opinion.”). These
concurrences were a natural result of the increased focus given to dissenting opinions.
Second, Justices during the Stone Court began to concur to indicate that they felt bound by a
precedent with which they disagreed. See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943)
(Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson stated:
I concur with the opinion of the Chief Justice. If the Court were to reconsider Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, in the light of the views expressed by Mr. Justice Black [in his dissenting
opinion in this case], I should adhere to the views I expressed in dissent there. Until we do so, I consider
myself bound by that decision.
See id. at 447. Both of these practices increased the ratio of separate opinions to opinions for the Court.
242. At least it never dropped below that mark in the years between 1966 and 1989. Chart B stops in
1989.
Judge Frank Easterbrook believes that simple counting exercises are of limited use. He argues that
while Justices may be writing more separate opinions in recent terms, the rate of real disagreement since
the 1940s has stayed steady at around 20%. Easterbrook defines real disagreement as disagreement over
legal principles—as opposed to disagreement over facts or procedure. See Frank H. Easterbrook,
Agreement Among the Justices: An Empirical Note, in 1984 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 389 (Philip
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss1/3
p137 Kelsh.doc 05/20/99   11:43 AM
1999] OPINION DELIVERY PRACTICES 1790-1945 179
This increase in the frequency of the issuance of separate opinions is a
central event in the history of the Court’s opinion-delivery practices. Before the
shift, unanimity was the norm; afterwards, fragmentation was expected. This
sharp rise has generated much commentary, some by Supreme Court Justices
themselves.243 Most of this commentary has been abstractly normative, asking
whether the increased number of separate opinions was good or bad.
At least two groups of scholars, however, have attempted to explain why the
rate rose at the time it did.244The first scholars to do so were Stephen Halpern
and Kenneth Vines.245 Halpern and Vines argue that the passage of the Judiciary
Act of 1925, popularly known as the Judges’ Bill, was the primary cause of the
Stone-era increase in the nonunanimity rate. The Judges’ Bill gave the Justices
increased control over their docket.246 Halpern and Vines note a slight increase
in the nonunanimity rate for the years following the passage of the Bill. They tie
this increase to the greater freedom the 1925 Bill gave to the Justices, writing:
“developing and articulating a coherent judicial philosophy perhaps took on a
greater significance for individual Justices after the Act.”247
The second group of scholars to consider the question, Thomas Walker, Lee
Epstein, and William Dixon, conclude that the Judges’ Bill is not the primary
reason for the Court’s increased issuance of separate opinions.248 This gr up
notes that the rate at which separate opinions were issued did not begin to
increase significantly until 1941, fifteen years after the Judges’ Bill had taken
effect.249 They reject three other possible explanations250 as well and argue that
B. Kurland et al. eds., 1985).
243. See, e.g., Fred M. Vinson, Supreme Court Work: Opinion on Dissents, 20 J. OKLA. B.A. 1269
(1949); William O. Douglas, Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy, 32 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 104
(1948); Harlan F. Stone, Dissenting Opinions Are Not Without Value, 26 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 78
(1942). For more recent writings by Justices on the role of dissent, see Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting
Opinion, 1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH.
L. REV. 133 (1990); William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L. J. 427 (1986);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Obligation To Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 205 (1985).
244. I am not here including C. Herman Pritchett, whose influential book The Roosevelt Court also
deals with the increase in nonunanimity during the Stone Court. See supra note 195.
245. See Stephen Halpern & Kenneth Vines, Institutional Disunity, The Judges’ Bill and the Role of
the Supreme Court, 30 W. POL. Q. 471 (1977).
246. See id. at 474.
247. Id. at 482-83. This analysis corresponds with the increased concern each Justice had about his
own record during this period. The historical record reviewed above, however, shows that this concern
manifested itself before 1925. See supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
248. See Walker et al., supra note 159, at 364-66.
249. See id. at 365-66.
250. The other rejected explanations are that the rise was caused by changes in the makeup of the
Court’s caseload, the promotion of a sitting Associate Justice to be Chief Justice, and changes in the
Court’s composition. See id. at 366-78.
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it was the leadership of Harlan Fiske Stone that was responsible for the increase
in the dissent rate. Not only was Stone ineffective as a leader,251 he a so was the
first Chief Justice to believe that “imposed unanimity was no virtue in
developing the law.”252 Earlier Chief Justices had created a “no dissent unless
absolutely necessary” tradition.253 Stone rejected this tradition and urged his
colleagues to do the same. The Associate Justices, many of whom were new on
the bench, readily agreed, and the tradition favoring unanimity was snuffed out
forever.254
Both the Halpern and Vines and the Walker, Epstein, and Dixon studies are
helpful as short-term explanations of what happened in 1941. It is undoubtedly
true that the increased control over the docket led to a proliferation of harder
cases that carried with them greater opportunities for dissent. It is also true that
the sharp increase would not have occurred had Chief Justice Stone not broken
with his predecessors’ attitude regarding the propriety of dissent.
Both of these explanations, however, are limited by a narrow temporal
focus. The passage of the Judges’ Bill and the elevation of Stone were
important, but only as immediate causes. The Stone-era changes can be
understood in another way.
Rather than being viewed as the result of specific changes made in 1925 or
1941, the Stone-era rise can also be explained by reference to the historical
trends discussed above. By 1941 attitudes toward separate opinions had
changed dramatically. Justices no longer needed to justify a decision to write
251. See id. at 379.
252. Id. at 384.
253. Id. at 382 (citations omitted).
254. See id. at 386. It is clear from an examination of the cases, however, that the pro-unanimity
norm had weakened considerably in the years immediately before Stone took over as Chief Justice. In the
1930s, Justices very rarely expressed regret at having to dissent. The few Justices who did so were,
ironically, the Justices that were most likely to write separately. Justice Frankfurter, for example, wrote in
1939:
I join in the Court’s opinion but deem it appropriate to add a few remarks. The volume of the Court’s
business has long since made impossible the early healthy practice whereby the Justices gave expression
to individual opinions. But the old tradition still has relevance when an important shift in constitutional
doctrine is announced . . . .
Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 487 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted). Frankfurter, however, was second only to William Douglas among all of the Stone and Vinson
Justices in terms of frequency of issuance of separate opinions. See BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 5,
app. at 147-49 tbl. 11. Justice Black’s comments regarding dissent are also interesting. In his first term on
the bench, Black several times explained why he chose to dissent. See, e.g., McCart v. Indianapolis Water
Co., 302 U.S. 419, 423 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (“The importance of the questions here involved
leads me to set out some of my reasons for this belief.”). Black quickly ceased explaining himself. In 1938
he wrote separately 12 times and never once offered an explanation.
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separately.255 The universe of cases for which dissent was appropriate had
expanded dramatically.256 Much more attention was paid to the thinking of
individual Justices, and Justices frequently used separate opinions to explain
themselves.257 Separate opinions were cited for propositions of law and several
had ultimately triumphed and become law.258
Had these changes not occurred, the passage of the Judges’ Bill and the
elevation of Stone to Chief Justice would have had little effect on the rate at
which Justices expressed dissent.259 These changes conditioned the attitude of
the Justices, so that by the time Stone announced his attitude shift, they were
more than willing to follow. Unlike previous generations of Justices, these
Justices had inherited a tradition in which separate opinions were seen as having
many uses.
The changes identified by Halpern and Vines and Walker, Epstein, and
Dixon are therefore best understood as catalysts for change. Such changes
would not have had the effect they did had the underlying attitude toward
separate opinions not undergone the historical shift outlined above.
III. CONCLUSION
As should be apparent, the system the Supreme Court now uses to deliver
opinions is a product of the historical choices and changes described above. The
basic structure of opinion delivery—whereby opinions are delivered by a single
Justice speaking for the Court and other Justices are free to write separately—
was first established in the Marshall years.260 The current attitude that separate
opinions play a legitimate role in many different areas of law is an extension of
views first developed in the years between 1864-1940.261 The freedom that
Justices today feel to write separately is a product of these views and the Stone-
era explosion in individual judicial expression.
It should be equally apparent, however, that the system could have evolved
in other ways. Chief Justice Marshall could have continued the early Court’s
practice of deciding cases by either per curiam or seriatim opinions.262 Justice
255. See supra notes 159-71 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 159-71 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 175-201 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 202-30 and accompanying text.
259. It is also true that had these changes not occurred, Stone probably would not have had the
attitude he had upon becoming Chief Justice.
260. See supra notes 36-80 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 202-30 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p137 Kelsh.doc 05/20/99   11:43 AM
182 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:137
Johnson could have decided to follow the lead of his brethren and never write
separately.263 The Justices might never have abandoned the belief that dissent is
appropriate only in a narrow category of cases.264 Had any of this taken place,
the Court would undoubtedly today be a very different place.
263. See supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
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